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Stone Walks: inhuman animacies and queer archives of feeling

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ABSTRACT
Excavating what Jeffrey Cohen [2015. Stone: An ecology of the inhuman. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press] calls ‘lithic ecomateriality’, in this paper we illustrate how rocks have traditionally been conceptualized through three tropes: rocks as insensate; rocks as personified; and rocks as transformative. We take up the concept of inhuman to challenge human-centric taxonomies of rocks and animacy. If rocks are not lifeless, or only considered as ‘resources’ or ‘threats’, to humans, then thinking with rocks as vital extends our ethical and political response. In the final section of the paper, we consider archives, not as a logical form of organizing knowledge, but as material, vital, and affective. We argue that when stones and archives are examined as something more than stable things – as interfactual, transcorporeal, and transmaterial co-compositions – different ethical relatings to the inhuman world become possible.

KEYWORDS
Walking methodologies; inhuman; animacy; transmateriality; archives; ethics

Stone Walks
Excavating what Cohen (2015) calls ‘lithic ecomateriality’, Stone Walks navigate rocky topographies in Canada, Wales, and Australia such as the Precambrian Canadian Shield on the shores of Georgian Bay, Ontario (see walkinglab.org). Stone Walks do not have a predetermined trajectory. We walk, and while we walk we might activate one or more of these propositions: read theory aloud, takes notes and/or write, talk, sit, take photographs, and use wool to felt small rocks found near the shore. Sometimes we walk three feet and sometimes kilometres. Distance, pace, endurance, and route are not predetermined or known in advance. Stone Walks are a propositional practice (Truman & Springgay, 2016). This practice embodies what Stengers (2005) calls a politics of slowness. For Stengers, slow is not a measure or a speed, but creates a space for hesitation and resistance, which produce new modes of relating. Slowness is speculative. Slowness asks questions about what might happen if we could learn with the world, rather than about it. Stone Walks are experimental. They refuse a framing of pedagogy as an exclusively human activity, and insist on entangled relations between humans and non-humans. Stone Walks become an assemblage of bodies, rocks, walking, talking, reading, and theory, all of which are animate material forces that act on each other frictionally.

Friction is a force that acts in the opposite direction to movement. It slows movement, ‘resist[s] the consensual way in which the situation is presented’ (Stengers, 2005, p. 994).
Friction exists every time bodies come into contact with each other, like different strata grinding against one another. Writing about the intersection between assemblage theory and intersectionality, Puar (2012) argues that the convergence of the two theoretical frameworks is neither reconcilable, nor oppositional, but frictional. Puar (2007) argues that theoretical concepts need not be united or synthesized, but that they can be productive to hold concepts together in tension. Similarly, Tuana (2008) contends that fluidity and flows overlook ‘sites of resistance and opposition’ while viscosity ‘retains an emphasis on resistance to changing form’ (p. 194). The viscosity of a liquid is a measure of its resistance to tension. For liquids we often think of viscosity in terms of thickness. Tuana introduces the idea of ‘viscous porosity’ emphasizing that thickness is not impenetrable or immutable, but something that undergoes change in and through friction (p. 188).

Stone Walks as frictional counter the pastoral and convivial nature that typify humanist approaches to walking. Existing scholarship on walking methodologies understand the human walker as the animate agent on a walk (Springgay & Truman, in press). In this paper, we focus on the frictional animacy of rocks, which have been conceptualized in Western philosophy as inanimate, in order to rupture taxonomic structures that privilege some forms of knowledge and life more than others.

The first section of the paper introduces the location of the Canadian Shield where we often walk. In the next section we illustrate how rocks have traditionally been conceptualized through three tropes: rocks as insensate; rocks as personified; and rocks as transformative. We take up the concept of the inhuman to challenge human-centric taxonomies of rocks and animacy. Shifting from an anthropocentric framework, where rocks are always considered for their use value – whether in making tools, art, or in terms of larger geopolitical exploitation like fracking and mining – examining the vitality of rocks requires that we attend to rocks’ ability to move, quiver, and reproduce. If rocks are not lifeless, or only considered as ‘resources’ or ‘threats’ to humans, then thinking with rocks as vital extends our ethical and political response. In the final section of the paper, we consider archives, not as a logical form of organizing knowledge, but as material, vital, and affective.

Systems of classification proliferate in the Anthropocene as taxonomies of knowledge, bodies, animacy, and the senses. In each instance, value is ascribed to that which is most ‘human’. If rocks, as we speculate, are fully animate, affective, quivering, and reproductive, then what we know or what we assume about such taxonomies must unravel. If matter is not immutable or passive, but agential and vital then we need, as Alaimo (2010) contends, ‘more potent, more complex understandings of materiality’ (p. 2). We argue that when stones and archives are examined as something more than stable things – as interfactual, transcorporeal, and transmaterial co-compositions – different ethical relatings to the inhuman world become possible.

The Canadian Shield: thinking-in-movement

To walk ‘with stone is intensely to inhabit that preposition with, to move from solitary individualizations to ecosystems, environments, shared agencies, and companionate properties’ (Cohen, 2015, p. 11, emphasis in original).

Walking on rocks in the Canadian Shield, along stony creek beds and, climbing up craggy rock faces is frictional. To walk on rocks is difficult. They are uneven, we have to scale steep rock walls, their surfaces can be slippery. Stone Walks engage with the intimacy
of crevices, of moss-covered mounds, and jagged faces. The rocks we walk are familiar to us. Sarah had her first bath in a rocky crater when she was two weeks old. Stephanie paddled and portaged across their barren and wind-blown surfaces every summer as a child. These rocks hold meaning. But slowness requires we let go of such longings and walk differently.

As opposed to thinking about rocks, slowness requires a thinking-in-movement. Thinking about rocks investigates how we as humans encounter rocks – what they look like, how they make us feel, the kinds of experiences they materialize. This mode of knowing puts the human at the centre of experience. Using thick description, researchers capture and represent the different ways that humans know rocks. Conversely, Stone Walks engender a thinking-in-movement (Springgay & Truman, in press). This thinking-in-movement ‘becomes a field of variations in which to experiment with the questions of how felt difference might register in thinking’ (McCormack, 2013, p. 11). Thinking-in-movement infers that we become open to stimuli we cannot represent. This shifts how we write about Stone Walks. For instance, we could easily describe the rocks rippling across the island, ribbons of grey black granite folded beneath puddles of water. We could describe how our bare feet fall on the uneven surface that is warm from the midsummer heat. But to do so would simply be to describe the rocks from our human perspective, to conform to human modes of subjectivity. The reverse risks anthropomorphizing rocks.

Thinking-in-movement demands a different proposition. Manning (2016) notes that methods insist that knowledge can become decipherable. She argues that ‘the unquantifiable within experience can only be taken into account if we begin with a mode of inquiry that refutes initial categorization’ (p. 5). In the case of our Stone Walks, to describe the walks in discursive terms, not only disavows their material vitality, it ‘results in stultifying its potential and relegating it to that which already fits within pre-existing schemata of knowledge’ (Manning, 2016, p. 5). Thinking-in-movement resists narrative descriptions of our rocky encounters. Likewise, it refuses tidy accounts of where and how we walked. Walking with stone, returning to Georgian Bay, demands that we think not about what the rocks mean to us, nor the memories they hold, but what vital and affective qualities are co-composed. For Manning (2016), this is a ‘thinking in the act … It is an incipient activity that summons intensities toward a coming-to-expression, a thinking directly imbued with rhythm, with feeling’ (p. 24). Thinking-in-movement is often incomprehensible in language, ‘alive only in its rhythms, in its hesitations, in its stuttering’ (p. 24). Thinking-in-movement as a practice of slowness means that on a Stone Walk affect passes between the various bodies (human and non-human) and forces us to thought. It was on one such walk that we started speculating on rocks as animate, as archives of affect, and what thinking otherwise about materialities, vitality, and worlding might mean for pedagogy.

The Canadian Shield is an exposed portion of Precambrian igneous and metamorphic rocks that underlies more than half of Canada, from The Great Lakes to the Arctic Ocean (and extends south to some parts of upper USA). The Shield is comprised of mountains that were once more than 12,000 feet tall – taller than the Himalayas – that grew out of plate tectonic collisions more than 3 million years ago. As the mountains eroded, their mountainous roots rose and eroded in turn. The rocks now visible as The Canadian Shield were once far below the Earth’s surface. Eroded, collided, and grinded down for 500 million years it remains the oldest part of North America, comprised of some of the
oldest rocks on earth, and some of the oldest (now extinct) volcanoes on earth. The Shield is rich in mineral deposits including gold, silver, nickel, copper, and iron ore. During colonial invasion of Canada and the ensuing construction of the Canadian National Railway the only way to build on the Shield was to blast through it, revealing its mineral inheritance. Mining ensued. The Shield is also rich in coniferous forests and covered with lakes and rivers, and consequently used for many large-scale forestry operations and hydroelectric developments. The trees grow sideways along Georgian Bay’s Eastern shore, clutching to the rocks, moulded by the prevailing west wind. Thirty thousand islands, some only a few feet across, dot their way between Honey Harbor and Killarney, Ontario. It is a romanticized landscape of colonial dreams. Many painters have tried to capture the colour and contours of Georgian Bay, many boaters have tried to conquer the waves, and many boats have crashed on the million rocks hiding just beneath the surface. It is portrayed as an unforgiving landscape, sunburnt, wind-blown, with poor topsoil. For all of its rugged weariness, the myth of the Canadian Shield is one of timelessness. It is memorialized as unchanging, pristine, untapped, and unaltering typified in the paintings by the Group of Seven (Figure 1).

**Taxonomies of rocks**

In western anthropocentric thinking, rocks have been positioned through three different tropes. These include: rocks as insensate; rocks as personified; and rocks as transformative. In all three tropes rocks are situated in relation to humans through their use value. In each case it is about what rocks can or cannot do for humans.

Rocks as insensate appear to stem from the Aristotelian taxonomy of animacy, which excludes stones in the hierarchy of animate things. According to Aristotle, things that

![Figure 1. Moon Bay with canoe, Georgian Bay (Photo by Sarah E. Truman).](image)
eat, reproduce, and grow, can possess a soul. Humans and then animals and then vegetables possess souls and are therefore ‘alive’, while stones do not and are therefore excluded from the hierarchical chain. Along with not being alive, rocks were also not considered dead, because to be dead assumed the capacity for life. As inert, rocks were insensate, which according to Chen (2012) is an ‘ontological dismissal’ (p. 4) of their vitality.

In contrast, rocks are often personified as stoic, wise, and commanding, thereby adopting values associated with the privileging of certain bodies over others. For example, in yoga the pose Tadasana (mountain pose), the practitioner assumes the state of a mountain as they have been personified—eternal, strong, and monumental. The phrase ‘solid as a rock’ is similarly used to describe certain qualities in humans most valued.

In the third trope, rocks like the Philosopher’s Stone, which has the transformative capacity to turn base metals into gold (a substance valued by humans) appears to suggest animacy and agency but always serves and benefits humans. In all three tropes, we argue, rocks are rendered as ‘a resource for recreation, consumption, and exploitation’ (Cohen, 2015, p. 9).

Like these common tropes of stones, animacy itself, according to Chen (2012) has been construed with the logic of the human. Linguistically animacy refers to the ‘quality of liveliness, sentience, or humanness of a noun or a noun phrase’ (p. 24). At the top of the animacy schema are individual, heteronormative, male able bodies, with intact capacities. As you move down the schema, as bodies and things become less agentic, they become less animate. Race and gender, for example, fall at the lower end of the animacy taxonomy. This taxonomy, Chen (2012) argues, is a contributing factor in dehumanization, where qualities valued as ‘human’ are removed. The senses are similarly connected to this animacy taxonomy. The base senses like touch, taste, and smell have been historically understood as attached to certain bodies, particularly those which are deemed less than human, such as women, children, and racialized Others (Springgay, 2008). The taxonomy of affect, or what Ahmed (2004) calls the ‘economies of affect’ work to regulate and dehumanize particular inhuman bodies. Systems of classification operate similarly in education, where what counts as knowledge is governed by hegemonic values associated with the human (Snaza & Weaver, 2015).

If the human is conceptualized as fully animate, changing, reproductive, and digestive then rocks signal its opposite—the inhuman. Recent scholarship in queer theory has problematized the concept of the inhuman. Rather than view the inhuman as the opposite of the human, the inhuman becomes a process by which human and non-human frictionally come together. In fact, Luciano and Chen (2015) find problematic the ways in which posthumanism melts the boundaries between human and non-human as an easy flow that is unobstructed. They posit the inhuman as a method of thinking otherwise, of thinking about the tensions, frictions, and viscous porosity of the human/non-human relation. They draw on the work of Edelman (2004) and Grosz (2011) who argue that enlivening the inhuman with animacy is not about demanding recognition into the category of human, ‘but issues from the proliferation of difference’ (Luciano & Chen, 2015, p. 187). Rather than simply demand that the inhuman be assimilated into the category of the human, a practice that Luciano and Chen (2015) argue is ‘a politics of rehabilitation and inclusion’, queer scholars are problematizing the ways in which we consider inside and outside, and how when we create such distinctions something is always left out.
Recognizing the important work by queer scholars that rupture and challenge ontological flattening, we make the rather perilous leap to rocks as inhuman others. We borrow the concept inhuman here for the ways that rocks have been dismissed from discussions of animacy in order to consider rocks from within. Here we draw on Cohen’s (2015) work on stones, which takes up the notion of the ‘inhuman’ by emphasizing both difference and intimacy. ‘In’ as a negative prefix presumes difference from something. It assumes a negative, or inept capacity. Likewise, ‘in’, he argues, describes being within something, a touching intimacy, or an ‘estranged interiority’ (p. 10). Rocks, as we have noted above, have always been considered inhuman. However, in what follows, we demonstrate through theories of vital materialism stone’s inhuman animacy. We hold the term inhuman frictionally. The inhuman does not sit easily as a term. It is abrasive and antagonistic. As a frictional account of animacy, the inhuman considers rocks as intimate relatings, while not erasing how rocks figure into inhumane ecological practices such as fracking and mining. Thinking the inhuman demands a form of responsibility, in which both the envisioning of an animate and different world is situated within specific material and bodily contexts (Figure 2).

**Inhuman animacy**

Excavating a lithic ecomateriality, we consider rocks from the perspective of inhuman animacy. For DeLanda (1997) ‘all spheres of reality, including geology, possess virtual morphogenetic capabilities and potentialities’ (n.p.). Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987) writing on ‘pure immanence’ helps us to think about this vitality. Pure immanence is ‘matter-movement’ or ‘matter-energy’ not applied externally to a body or object but comes from within.
(Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 407). This is important because rather than thinking about rocks as lively because of human imbibed characteristics such as a soul, rocks are animate because matter-movement exists in all things.

The Canadian Shield, for example, is composed of igneous and metamorphic rock. Igneous rocks form when magma cools and crystallizes into rocks. Sedimentary rocks are born from millions of years of pressure on sediment or other materials deposited on the earth’s surface. While metamorphic rocks form through chemical transformations resulting from heat and pressure acting on Igneous or Sedimentary rocks, producing a new kind of rock. The Canadian Shield like all rocks is comprised of mineral metals. All rock is composed of two or more minerals. For Deleuze and Guattari (1987) metal is a symbol of vitality par excellence. It ‘is metal that best reveals [a] quivering effervescence; it is metal, bursting with a life, that gives rise to “the prodigious idea of Nonorganic Life”’ (Bennett, 2010, p. 55). Metals, for Deleuze and Guattari, express the notion of pure immanence. For example, Deleuze and Guattari (1987) argue that material vitalism is ‘rendered unrecognizable’ because of the hylomorphic model (p. 411). The hylomorphic model assumes that form is given to materials externally. But Deleuze and Guattari, in their discussion on metal and metallurgy, insist that what metal ‘bring[s] to light is a life proper to matter, a vital state of matter as such, a material vitalism that exists everywhere’ (p. 411). Matter-energy does not come from something external to rocks, but is ‘in’ – recalling the ‘in’ of difference and intimacy in inhuman.

Metals, like most inorganic substances are polycrystalline, which means they consist of crystal grains whose atoms hold together in regular arrays. Yet, according to Bennett (2010) there are always imperfections in the arrays,

… notably the presence of loose atoms at the ‘interfaces’ of the grains. These atoms belong to none of the grains, and they render the boundaries of each grain porous and quivering. (p. 59, Italics added)

Consider the iron ore and component metals of the Canadian Shield quivering. Some of the oldest, seemingly static rocks on our planet quiver. The quivering is not simply a movement from one point to another, as in the example of a rock sliding down a hill, but is internal to itself, immanent, in and of intensities. Key to matter-movement is the imperceptibility of such quivering intensities.

Rocks as inhuman animacy are inherently lively, and unfold through heterogenous assemblages of intensities. As Bennett (2010) so aptly states: ‘In this strange, vital materialism, there is no point of pure stillness, no indivisible atom that is not itself aquiver with virtual force’ (p. 57). Stones are only inert when considered anthropocentrically. Bennett notes that things like iron chairs are perceived as immobile only because ‘their becoming proceeds at a speed or a level below the threshold of human discernment’ (p. 58). This is a matter of scale.

To think about stone’s animacy is to think molecularly, to think about how stone undermines stable and rigid categories. Metal’s heterogeneous assemblages act as catalysts for other chemical combinations. According to DeLanda (1997), a key idea is to ‘think of metals as being the most powerful catalysts on the planet’ (n.p.). A catalyst is a substance which can accelerate or decelerate a chemical reaction without being changed itself – it incites change but is not consumed by the change. For Deleuze and Guattari (1987), ‘Metal is the conductor of all matter’ (p. 411). Deleuze and Guattari conceive of metal as
a kind of probe-head, matter-energy, catalysing reactions in other substances, giving birth to novel entities through a material vitalism:

... metal is coextensive to the whole of matter, and the whole of matter to metallurgy. Even the waters, the grasses and varieties of wood, the animals are populated by salts or mineral elements. Not everything is metal, but metal is everywhere ... The machinic phylum is metallurgical, or at least has a metallic head, as its itinerant probe-head or guidance device. (p. 411)

The machinic phylum is a form of reproduction that is heterogenous and queer. Cohen (2015), drawing on the work of Caillois (1985), asks: ‘What if propulsive assemblage-making and its ecological effects are not limited to biological bodies? What if the alluring intensity of materiality is itself erotic’ (p. 238)? Stone’s inhuman animacy does not mimic human reproduction but incites and queers lithic desire.

Igneous rocks are shaped by petrogenesis, for example, clay and water mix to form stone, and they in turn proliferate and intensify relations. This queer sort of reproduction, one that is quivering and intense, invokes a different understanding of scale that is not human-centric. Lithic ecomateriality is not reducible to human scales or even human time. Stone’s inhuman animacy lies in the fact that its rate of change, its queer reproduction, its ‘in’ difference and intimacy are slow or imperceptible compared to how human’s perceive chronological time, scale, and space. Bennett (2010), citing Deleuze and Guattari (1987), notes that this kind of queer reproduction propels itself through a series of heterogeneous transformations, which are not moving from one fixed point to another, ‘but a tumbling of continuous variations with fuzzy borders’ (2010, p. 59). This tumbling is not, as in our example above, a rock sliding down a hill, but ‘in’, an involution.

The question of why consider rocks as inhuman animacies is important, we argue, for the ways that it unhinges the concept of affect from the human. Affect is not specific to humans or other living organisms. Inhuman animacy pushes the idea of liveliness, a worlding, ‘to an interstitial field of non-personal, ahuman forces, flows, tendencies, and trajectories’ (Bennett, 2010, p. 61) that we argue, are frictional. Inhuman animacy compels us to consider affect as that which forces us to thought. According to Deleuze, affects are not ‘things’, but are created through encounters. Affect is ‘the virtual co-presence of potentials’ (Massumi, cited in Zournazi, 2002, p. 213). A lithic ecomateriality opens archives – another taxonomic system – to affect, which in turn demands that we reconsider questions of responsibility and relatings. This is an ethics, as Bennett (2010) notes, which recognizes the ‘shimmering, potentially violent vitality intrinsic to matter’ (p. 61). Affective force demands an ‘expanded political ecology’, wherein we do not live on the earth, or learn about it, but with it (p. 11) (Figure 3).

**Queer archives of feeling**

Queer has been used variously to denote the unsettling of norms, to call attention to how sexuality, gender, and race are constituted and regulated by hierarchies of humanness (Luciano & Chen, 2015). Sedgwick (2003) uses the idea of ‘queer performativity’ as a production of meaning making, specifically related to shame, while Braidotti (2013) and Haraway (1988) take up the notion of making strange and the monstrous as practices of queering, or rupturing privilege. Queer ecocriticism has been used to challenge the nature/culture binary, and to think queer as complex system of interdependence
between humans and non-humans. In thinking about queer lithic reproduction and queer archives, however, we turn to Luciano and Chen (2015) who state that ‘the figure of the queer/trans body does not merely unsettle the human as norm; it generates other possibilities – multiple, cyborgian, spectral, transcorporeal, transmaterial – for living’ (p. 187). This, we contend, responds to Edelman’s (2004) appeal that rather than enlarge the spectre of the human, to include those often positioned outside of its boundaries, we need to reconsider what the inhuman might do for thinking difference otherwise. It is difference that Grosz (2011) argues is of pressing importance in re-thinking the inhuman. Inhuman difference, she writes, ‘stretches, transforms, and opens up any identity to its provisional vicissitudes, its shimmering self-variations that enable it to become other than what it is’ (p. 91). For Grosz, inhuman difference ruptures the need for taxonomies (which are grounded in an understanding of difference from), and rather insists that we think with Deleuze’s thought; ‘difference in itself, difference as a process which produces itself’ (p. 92). Stone’s inhuman animacy then, is immanent, infolded, and intimate.

Traditionally archives have been organized and ordered according to strict rules. Archival arrangement guidelines preserve the original order of documents as they are received into the archive. An archive, composed of a web of records, is understood as autonomous and separate from the archivist and the archival institution, and thus interpretation or textuality does not feature as part of an archive. While archives are not always written documents, whatever material composes an archive is typically structured linearly around canonical events, it is closed and limited, fulfils a scientific need, and its value is determined by normative historical or research truths. The archive is a place of order ruled by inert, naturalized, and detached values that relegates feelings and experiences that that cannot be documented easily to oblivion (Danbolt, Rowley, & Wolthers, 2009).

Figure 3. Rippling Rocks, Georgian Bay (Photo by Sarah E. Truman).
In *Archive Fever*, Derrida (1995) notes that the term archive derives from *arkheion*: ‘a house, a domicile, an address, the residence of superior magistrates, the archons, those who commanded’ (p. 2). While an archive represents a physical (or virtual) space that houses ‘objective’ documentation of past ‘events’, it also has inherent within the name the notion of authority regarding who can archive, who has access to the archive, and who can interpret the archive. Much qualitative research remains framed within our cultural habituation to the logic of the archive, yet as Derrida shows, there are aporias in archival logic, the first being as Derrida states ‘… what is archivable – that is, the content of what has to be archived is changed by the technology’ (Derrida, 2002, p. 46) and ‘archividation produces as much as it records the event’ (Derrida, 1995, p. 17). Derrida (1995) highlights the *aporetic* process of documentation by describing how through using archival procedures we seek to preserve an object or experience by removing it from circulation, seek to legitimate an event by naming and recording it, seek to forget an event through remembering it in another form, and seek to seal the meaning of something that can never be closed.

Similar to his readings of linguistic or cultural texts, Derrida shows that although a version of archival logic is predominant in our culture, its own logic is flawed: ‘The archivist always produces more archive, and that is why the archive is never closed. It opens out to the future … ‘ instead of sealing meaning, archival procedures produce more meanings (1995, p. 45). Similar discussions about the failure of the archive’s logic exist in performance studies. For example, Schneider (2011) challenges the Western logic of documentation and asks researchers to investigate how performances or embodied experiences although vanishing in some ways also ‘remain differently’, perhaps corporeally or affectively in ‘body-to-body transmission’ (pp. 98–99). Schneider critiques the ‘phallocentric insistence … ‘ that if performed practices are ‘… not visible, given to documentation or sonic recording, or otherwise housable within an archive’, they are lost (p. 101). Schneider ponders whether our understanding of the uncapturability of events is ‘predetermined by our cultural habituation to the logic of the archive?’ (p. 98, italics added).

Further to this, Cvetkovich (2003) proposes a queer archival practice that does not follow the same principles of selection and inclusion as traditional archives, whose value is defined according to historical or research interests, and which are devoid of affect and emotion. A queer archive of feelings: resists coherence in favour of fragmentation; it follows an archiving practice that is illogical where documents represent far more than the literal value of the objects themselves; and are ‘composed of material practices that challenge traditional conceptions of history and understand the quest for history as a psychic need rather than a science’ (p. 268). Although the materials and documents that constitute a traditional archive or a queer archive can be similar, a queer archive of feeling does not fulfil an institutional or official function. A queer archive of feeling is a form of counter-knowledge production, as a dynamic that unlocks, or liberates the archive. As an archive it is not rooted in a fixed notion of a past but rather a futurity and urgency, shifting between fields of destruction, subversion, and regeneration. A queer archive of feeling seeks to share the affective tone of a process or event rather than relay strict chronologies or typologies of identification. The affective tone of an event outlives the event. This shifts the function of the archive. Rather than an archive encapsulating what happened, the archive creates invitations to re-activate the event’s core propositions. As we have noted, rocks are typically perceived as inert and enduring.
They are often seen as an archive of the earth’s history. However, geologists refer to the rock record which is not a chronological representation of geologic strata and histories. Because rocks erode, melt, collapse, and invert, the parts of rocks that we encounter are productions of difference. They are always immanent. Thus, rocks, we argue, queer archives.

The queer archive of feeling assembles images, text and other matter through incongruous anachronistic affect. Rather than a repository, a queer archive of feeling is a propositional practice, in which newness is created, from within itself. As queer archives of feeling, *Stone Walks* demand that we not think about what we can take from or collect of stones, or how we feel about stones, but rather to think in relation to their affective force, their quivering vitality. Affect, writes, Manning (2013) ‘never locates itself in the individual body’ (p. 28). Pressing foot to jagged rock, hand to slimy moss-covered stone is a machinic conjunction that propels, it ‘create[s] openings, intervals, fluxes of potential relations. They propose, they risk, they move’ (p. 52). The affective force of rocks is not empathetic, it is not of the individual, or of the human. Inhuman animacy might very well be, as Deleuze (1990) claims where ‘solutions are engendered at precisely the same time that the problem determines itself’ (p. 121).

*Stone Walks* as a queer archives of feeling engender an ethics that is not human-centred. It is an ethics that is ‘accountable to a material world that is never merely an external place but always the very substance of ourselves and others’ (Alaimo, 2010, p. 158). Cohen (2015) wonders if queer ecologies rupture the distinction between nature/culture and human/non-human, wherein we conceive of an inhuman ethics that includes stone. This is an ethics that breaches ‘ontological solitudes, defying exclusive taxonomies, undermining closed systems’ (p. 228). Manning (2013) issues similar concerns about responsibility in the face of the event asking how to ‘conceive of relations of force over and above a power structure that puts the individual at the centre’ (p. 69)? Inhuman animacy demands that a response not be directed from a human or to humans, which Manning contends is bound up in human-centric considerations of empathy and generosity, that ‘maintain the other as victim or perpetrator, keeping the strata rigid’ (p. 72).

Writing about affect, Colebrook (2011) has noted that a problem facing the anthropocene is not a lack of affect, but rather that humans are consumed by it. We are saturated with affect – from popular culture, to catastrophic acts of terror, to destructive environmental disasters – we are compelled by the sheer force of affect. Yet, this affect, she argues, is problematic in that it has been consumed by a rhetoric of affections or emotions. In the face of fracking, mining, and earthquakes, stone’s affect is organized according to how the world faces annihilation as it is felt – out there. This out there is experienced by bodies but it is not ‘in’ us, in difference, and intimacy (Springgay, 2016). Colebrook states:

As long as everything is organized according to consumption and production (in terms of the digits of the private organism) the potential for forces to be produced – such as affects – will always be grounded upon affections … As long as affects are confused with affections, or feelings of the lived body, then nothing will ever be felt; the body will only re-live itself. (2011, p. 81)

*Stone Walks* as queer archives of feeling counter this by attending not to ‘organized units and feelings, not to the lived body, but to the quantities and relations of forces from which
identifiable bodies and sentiments emerge’ (Colebrook, 2011, p. 82). Affect has to do with the inhuman’s capacity to create circuits of force that rupture and shatter human emotive captures. Affect is not something already lived and actualized but is ‘intensive, creating new relations and lines of thought, opening different mappings or potentials among what is, what is lived, and what might be thought’ (p. 83).

Stone Walks as speculative propositions require that we learn with the world rather than about it. The ‘in’ of inhuman, intimacy, and in difference is opposed to an approach to learning that is structured by taxonomies that will always, no matter how exhaustive, exclude some forms of knowledge, some bodies, and some inhuman animacies. Once education recognizes that animacy is not restricted to humans but must be seen as an attribute of all matter, then “politics” undergoes a dramatic, even vertiginous expansion’ (Snaza, Sonu, Truman, & Zaliwska, 2016, p. 6). Inhuman animacy and queer archives of feeling engage with different propositions: they resituate ‘in’ – inhuman, in difference, intimacy, involution – as a responsibility that is situated, in context, and affective.

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